From the Bad Beginning to the Slippery Slope to the Penultimate Peril and The End - the
BC NDP election story makes for grim reading
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| Adrian Dix in Victoria during election campaign - Cassandra photo |
Tuesday May 21,
2013
By Bill Tieleman
"I'm
sorry to say that the book you are holding in your hands is extremely
unpleasant... It is my sad duty to write down these unpleasant tales but there
is nothing stopping you from putting this book down at once and reading
something happy, if you prefer that sort of thing."
-
Lemony Snicket, A Series of Unfortunate
Events
The
BC New Democrat campaign that led to last week's stunning reversal of fortune
by Premier Christy Clark is A Series of Unfortunate Events with politically
tragic consequences.
Like
the series of books about the "intelligent, charming and resourceful"
Baudelaire youngsters, the BC NDP seems cursed with endlessly repeating bad
luck -- the evil Count Olaf returns just as things appear brightest.
How
the NDP's 17 per cent lead in public polling
as the election started, with 61 per cent of voters wanting a change in
government and 63 per cent disapproving of Clark's performance, dramatically
turned into an increased BC Liberal fourth term is a sad tale for New
Democrats.
There
were three strategic NDP campaign errors, in retrospect: rejecting negative
advertising; reversing position to oppose the Kinder Morgan oil pipeline and
failing to conduct appropriate campaign polling.
And
with BC Liberals frantically spinning stories designed to make Clark look more
like the "people's premier" than the reality -- voters' reluctant
choice -- it's important to look at all the facts.
Book
the First: The Bad Beginning
BC
NDP leader Adrian Dix said a year before the election campaign that his party
would not engage in negative attack ads despite the BC Liberals and supporters
vicious campaign targeting him.
"In
the last seven months, the Liberal party and its allies have spent between $2
and $3 million on running personal attack ads against, well, me," Dix told supporters in
Parksville last May.
"A
lot of people think the way to respond to negative ads is to run negative ads
ourselves," Dix argued. "The reason we are not going to do this is
very simple."
"First,
1.7 million people didn't vote in the last provincial election. We are not
going to bring anybody back to politics by deciding the winner of an election
is the person with the best ad agency to run the nastiest negative ads. We need
to bring people back to politics and that means offering some hope that change
will happen," Dix said.
Despite
my own political experience that negative advertising works even though people
say they hate it, I reluctantly accepted
that Dix might well be right. I even outlined some political research backing
those views -- but we were both dead wrong.
And
the campaign managed by veteran Ontario New Democrat Brian Topp, one of the
architects of late NDP leader Jack Layton's success, stayed positive until
almost the end.
And
not only did 1.7 million voters stay home again, but the BC NDP, the BC
Liberals and even the Green Party all dropped
in both popular vote and actual ballots cast for them.
The
BC Liberals dropped to 44.4 per cent from 45.8 per cent in 2009, the NDP to
39.5 per cent from 42.1 per cent and the Greens to 8 per cent from 8.2 per
cent. All three parties dropped in votes in initial Elections BC counts, the BC
Liberals by 28,000, the NDP by 48,000 and the Greens by 4,100.
Only
the BC Conservatives increased their tallies, more than doubling their popular
vote to 4.8 per cent from 2.1 per cent -- due to more than doubling their
candidates to 56 in 2013 versus 24 in 2009.
That
leaves the BC Liberals with 50 seats, up five from dissolution, the NDP at 33,
down three and the Greens with their first ever B.C. seat, Andrew Weaver in Oak
Bay-Gordon Head, while the BC Conservatives were shut out.
Bad
Beginning
The
Bad Beginning for the NDP was to conclude that because the BC Liberal and
Concerned Citizens for B.C. group led by ex-Clark advisor and corporate CEO Jim
Shepard had spent millions
unsuccessfully attacking Dix without affecting his good polling in the year
before the election that negative advertising wouldn't work for either side in
2013.
Without
strongly defining the BC Liberals and Clark as a government that urgently
needed to be terminated by voters for an incredibly long list of sins, the NDP
couldn't make the winning case for change.
That
allowed the BC Liberals to successfully argue that the BC NDP slogan of
"change for the better" would actually amount to change for the worse
-- and they did that with a vengeance.
Their
advertising and Clark's every appearance was a tightly scripted message box
focused on the alleged mayhem Dix's NDP would inflict on B.C. jobs and the
economy.
The
BC Liberals own prescription was patently absurd: a balanced budget that bond
rating agencies rejected;
elimination of debt in 15 years through revenue from non-existent liquefied
natural gas plants; and "controlled spending" from a premier that
increased B.C.'s debt by $11 billion in just two years.
But
all said with a very pleasant smile and the professional conviction of someone
selling soap on television.
At
the same time, the NDP were talking about increasing taxes to pay for skills
training -- did its pre-campaign polling show that was a winner?
And
what happened to health care and education in this campaign -- the two
strongest cards in the NDP hand against the BC Liberals?
Book
the Tenth: The Slippery Slope
On
Earth Day, April 22, Dix made a major announcement: an NDP government would
reject the proposed twinning of the Kinder Morgan pipeline to Burnaby to
transport crude oil from Alberta to Vancouver for oil tanker shipment overseas.
This
after previously stating several times, including on April 11 on the Voice Of
B.C. television show, that the NDP would not take a position on the
controversial issue despite the party already opposing the Enbridge Northern
Gateway pipeline proposal.
"They
haven't actually made an application," Dix told
host Vaughn Palmer of the Vancouver Sun. "I think as a matter of
principle, you should actually see what the application is before you address
it."
Then
came the slippery slope.
Dix's
decision was the result of an intense lobbying effort by environmentalists, NDP
MLAs and candidates convinced it was the morally right thing to do -- and
politically advantageous as well to head off the Green Party, which was
campaigning hard in Victoria and Vancouver on its own absolute opposition to
both pipelines.
There
was also concern that massive protests against Kinder Morgan would turn B.C.
into another environmental battleground, to the province's detriment.
But
in retrospect, the Kinder Morgan "surprise" was likely the pivotal
event of the entire campaign, an opinion I unusually share with former federal
Conservative cabinet minister Chuck Strahl.
"But
the turning point in the election was when Clark crystallized the connection
between her party and jobs and the economy. The momentum shifted," Strahl wrote
in The Globe and Mail May 16.
First,
it appeared to validate for many undecided and soft-NDP voters BC Liberal
claims that the NDP was "anti-jobs" and would damage the economy,
even though Clark herself never said that Kinder Morgan would proceed either,
unless it met all five of her conditions, one of which -- royalty payments --
Alberta had already
rejected.
Secondly,
it may have confirmed BC Liberal attacks that an NDP government under Dix would
"flip-flop" on important issues.
And
despite massive evidence that the BC Liberals had repeatedly done the same on
the Harmonized Sales Tax, balanced budgets, selling BC Rail and much more, the
NDP's rejection of negative advertising on those important issues during the
campaign and before left it vulnerable to being the only party seen as
"flip-flopping."
Thirdly,
it alienated what now seems to be a significant number of blue-collar workers
who support the construction of pipelines and the extraction of natural
resources. (Disclosure: some of my clients represent or employ construction and
resource industry workers.)
It
was no accident that Clark continually appeared on television during the
campaign wearing a hard hat and safety vest in private sector workplaces. Dix
by contrast was almost always in a suit and tie.
The
BC Liberals knew those workers and their families are be concentrated in key
swing ridings like Kamloops-North Thompson, which Environment Minister Terry
Lake had won by just 510 votes in 2009 but increased that to a 2,818 margin in
2013.
Kamloops-North
Thompson also has an amazing political record: the party that wins this
bellwether seat has formed
government since party politics were introduced to B.C.
But
the NDP's Kinder Morgan rejection was also likely a factor in other
resource-based ridings like Fraser-Nicola, where veteran NDP MLA Harry Lali was
surprisingly defeated by 754
votes and even in suburban ridings with blue-collar private sector
workers.
The
NDP's three-term incumbent Jagrup Brar lost in Surrey-Fleetwood to Langley City
Mayor Peter Fassbender by just 265 votes, Joe Trasolini lost by 543 votes the
Port Moody-Coquitlam NDP seat he had won in the by-election upset of April
2012, as did Gwen O'Mahoney in Chilliwack-Hope.
The
NDP also narrowly lost seats it previously held where sitting MLAs retired and
were replaced by newcomers: in Delta North, Coquitlam-Maillardville and Maple
Ridge-Pitt Meadows.
However,
the NDP's Kinder Morgan opposition may also have created upset narrow victories
over the BC Liberals for the party's David Eby in Vancouver-Point Grey, George
Heyman in Vancouver-Fairview, Jane Shin in Burnaby-Lougheed and Gary Holman in
Saanich North and the Islands, where pipeline opposition was strong.
But
would some or all of them have won anyway without the NDP changing its position
on Kinder Morgan?
Certainly
picking up several seats in an election where the NDP overall lost ground is
unusual.
But
ultimately the NDP needed to gain a minimum of seven new seats to form a
majority of 43 in the B.C. Legislature and it lost three, likely on a slippery
slope coated in oil politics.
And
in several ridings like Fraser-Nicola, the Green Party vote easily exceeded the
NDP margin of loss; in Lali's case, for example, the Green's took 1,174 votes
despite the NDP promising to kill not one but two oil pipelines.
Overall
it may be less the case that the Greens split the vote so much as that
environmentalists could not deliver Green-leaning supporters to the NDP despite
the Kinder Morgan move.
And
indeed I received an email after the election complaining that the BC NDP had
not taken a strong position on fish farms and saving wild salmon compared to
the Greens.
Noted
activist Alexandra Morton only called for an
NDP vote the day before the election, a message many would not have
heard.
Certainly
an analysis by The
Tyee of the impact of Green voters indicates that it is unlikely
more than three seats were arguably "lost" to the NDP in this
election.
One
of the most troubling issues for both parties will be to re-examine if a
significant number of British Columbia voters truly do see election choices as
jobs versus the environment.
Book
the Twelfth: The Penultimate Peril
The
next to final chapter of the Lemony Snicket series brings our heroes to the
Hotel Denouement -- an appropriate description of the NDP campaign's final
destination.
What
is now abundantly clear is that the NDP was not conducting rolling polls throughout
the election in key swing ridings to pick up trends and adjust the campaign
accordingly, as the BC Liberals were.
In
fact, the NDP disconcertingly switched polling firms during the campaign -- and
instead relied solely on internal province-wide surveys to guide them.
Even
worse, when those internally polls did show a tightening race and potentially
serious trouble for the NDP during the campaign, when there was still time to
change course, attack hard and salvage an election win, the response was muted
and ineffective.
To
be fair, the fact that external polling for media outlets did not pick up
anything beyond a measurable but not dramatic tightening of the race, added to
the NDP's lack of panic.
In
the final 10 days the party responded with a tougher message and a new round of
TV and other ads criticizing the BC Liberal record.
But
the ads were clearly put together at the last minute, featuring only text-based
headlines about the HST, B.C. Rail and the "quick wins" scandal -- a
reference that only political junkies could decipher.
There
were no photos of Christy Clark and Gordon Campbell, no reminder of the 12-year
record of BC Liberal government failures, increase in debt, loss of jobs and
promise of even more of the same.
With
the BC Liberals gaining steam daily towards an election victory, the NDP
response was tepid when a full frontal assault was the only chance left to win.
The
BC Liberal campaign team's self-aggrandizement effort in recent days claims
that only they knew from key riding polls that Clark could succeed.
The
reality is that the NDP campaign forfeited its last chance to change the course
of the election before it was too late. They had already checked into the Hotel
Denouement.
Book
the Thirteenth: The End
The
BC NDP has a problem even more damning than losing a 17 per cent lead in a
28-day election campaign and facing at least four more years in opposition.
The
party is on a downward trend that changing leaders and campaign managers has
failed to arrest.
Its
actual votes have steadily dropped from an all-time high of 824,544 in 1986,
ironically when NDP leader Bob Skelly lost to Social Credit Premier Bill Vander
Zalm in what has been seen as the party's worst campaign, to 643,399 in 2013
under Dix.
From
NDP leaders Bob Strachan in the 1960s to Tom Berger to Dave Barrett to Mike
Harcourt to Glen Clark to Ujjal Dosanjh to Carole James to Adrian Dix, Skelly's
vote total amazingly stands as the high water mark.
It
is also a testament to the power of attack advertising, as after Skelly's disastrous
start to the campaign, the NDP went highly negative on Vander Zalm and brought
its popular vote up to 42.6 per cent versus Social Credit's 49.3 per cent.
The
NDP looked good after winning the 1991 election under Mike Harcourt and the
surprise 1996 election victory under Glen Clark (when I was communications
director in the premier's office).
But
the NDP was devastated in 2001 after Ujjal Dosanjh took over from interim
premier Dan Miller, who filled in after Clark was forced to resign.
Dropping
from 39 seats to just two after Gordon Campbell won an astonishing 77 was earth
shattering for the NDP.
Under
new leader Carole James, the NDP rebounded in 2005 to 33 seats and 41.5 per
cent of the vote, a return to its traditional strength. But Campbell won 46
seats and 45.8 per cent to hold power.
The
2009 election saw little change, with Campbell winning 49 seats and James 35
and the NDP trailing just before
and throughout the entire campaign.
Internal
NDP caucus dissent led to James' resignation and Dix became leader in 2011,
following similar discontent in the BC Liberals over the HST that led to
Campbell's resignation and Clark's ascent.
Dix
built a significant lead over Clark in consistent polling starting in March
2011 and was 17 per cent ahead to start the 2013 election.
But
then A Serious of Unfortunate Events destroyed that hard-won advantage.
There
are many other lessons to be learned or relearned for New Democrats in the
years ahead.
A
few points are already clear.
Negative
advertising is here to stay, in B.C. and across Canada. There will be no more
attempts to run positive campaigns by any party, anywhere.
Declining
voter turnout hurts democracy overall but it damages the NDP more than its
right-wing opponents.
Scandals
rarely defeat governments and don't motivate voters, their own circumstances
do. If not, Campbell would have lost in 2005 and 2009 and Clark in 2013.
When
voters are pushed to a forced choice between honesty and exceedingly
unrealistic optimism, they will take the latter even if not convinced.
And
if voters have to pick between a positive change of government and a threat of
a negative change in the economy and jobs, they will fearfully avoid perceived
risk.
There's
one thing that even flawed polling makes clear: voters chose the BC Liberals in
spite of -- not because of -- Premier Christy Clark.
Even
if publicly released horse race numbers were wrong just a day before the
election, that does not mean Clark's 58 per cent disapproval rating or the 58
per cent of those polled who wanted a different government dramatically
reversed themselves.
No,
the truth that the BC Liberal party hierarchy wants to hide is that voters
picked Clark despite their disapproval of her performance, not because they
changed their minds about her attributes.
That
fact may make for an exceptional short honeymoon for B.C.'s first elected woman
premier. But Clark's 28-day campaign has given her four years to try and
convince voters they made the right choice.
Adrian
Dix faces a much tougher test after losing an election nearly everyone expected
him to win.
But
those who are angry and resentful now have to recognize that no one complained
when Dix made endless tours of the province to rally support for the last two
years, mending a divisive party.
No
one faulted Dix as he raised record amounts of money and surprising support
from the corporate sector for the NDP.
And
nary a word of internal criticism was heard when he outlined modest but
achievable plans for a future NDP government and led an exceedingly effective
opposition in the B.C. Legislature.
Indeed,
everyone I spoke with in the party and beyond was incredibly impressed with his
intelligence, work ethic and ability to speak powerfully, at length and without
notes everywhere he went.
I
also didn't see a series of columns saying Dix was doing it all wrong -- just
the opposite. And I wasn't hearing private concerns in those two years, in fact
not until a few NDP veterans uninvolved in the central campaign contacted me
toward the end of the election, worried correctly then as it turned out.
If
Dix did something truly wrong, sadly it was in appealing to us to believe in
people's better nature.
That
was based on his polling numbers surviving right through some of the most
vicious personal attacks Canada has ever seen, frustrating BC Liberal
strategists and convincing some in Clark's party that she had to go as leader.
And it was also based on Dix's own personal beliefs.
But
the BC Liberals' faith in fear was ultimately rewarded during the campaign.
The
NDP did, however, do something that proved a huge mistake: it left enormous,
election-changing strategy decisions up to a small group of people: Dix, Topp
and some senior caucus and party staff.
Those
decisions have left Dix a disheartened opposition leader instead of B.C's new
premier.
But
the NDP must also face tough facts that go well beyond its leader and its
disastrous campaign if it truly wants to compete for power in 2017.
There will
be no easy answers and no quick solutions to a series of unfortunate events.
.
